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Introduction 
An  effective  enforcement .of the  'one country  two  systems'  concept  enshrined  in  the  Joint 
Declaration and Basic Law is fundamental to Hong Kong's lasting stability and prosperity. This 
in tum w_ill  benefit the European Union, which, like other world partners, has for many years 
enjoyed a dynamic trade and investment relationship driven in part by Hong Kong's independent 
free market economy. It will also benefit mainland China, for whom a robust, globally integrated 
Hong  Kong  is  a  powerful  buttress  to  its  own  economic  refonns.  The  EU  therefore  sees  the 
upholding of  the Hong Kong Special  Admi~istrative Region's autonomy, within the 'one country 
two  systems'  concept,  as  a  central  plank  of its  policy  towards: the  territory  and  a  major 
·component of  its relationship with China as a whole. 
The  EU  set  about  upgrading  its  links  with  the  SAR  in  April  last  year  by  adopting  a 
Communication  from  the  European  Commission  entitled  « The  European  Union  and  Hong 
Kong: beyond  1997 ».  The aim was to  set Europe's ties with- the territory on a deeper,  more 
perm'anent footing, while. supporting its· aUtonomy, helping to strengthen its role in Asia and the 
world, and monitonng respect for the rights guaranteed to its_ citizens under the Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law of  the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:. For the EU, these rights are 
not just valid in themselves. They are inseparable from the autonomous system upon which Hong 
Kong's-lasting success depends. 
In the context of  this Communication, the Commission undertook to produce an annual report on 
relations between the EU ;,tnd  Hong Kong.  This is the first such report.  The Commission notes 
that the European Parliament has produced its own report on Hong Kong, and ·duly transmits this 
document to the Par.liament and the Council of  Ministers for information. 
0 
The economy 
In the summer of 1997 all eyes were on the h~dover  and the ability of  China to ensure a smooth 
. trans!tion with minimum  disruption  to. Hong  Kong's economic  dynamism.  In the  event,  the 
" Report on the European Union and Hong Kong: Beyond 1997 (  COM(97)0 171 - C4-0214/97), produced by the 
Etiropean Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy. Rapporteur: John Cushnahan. 
1 handover went smoothly thanks to careful and sensitive handling by the authorities both in Hong 
Kong and Beijing. The focus then changed with the onset of the Asian .financial crisis. The root 
causes of the crisis - among them weak financia1  regulation, inappropriate exchange rate pegs, 
excessive foreign borrowing and over-spending on infrastructure- were prevalent in some Asian 
economies, but not in Hong Kong, whose commitment to  transparency and  sound finance has 
remained exemplary. The SAR subsequently became a victim of  the contagion, not a cause of  the 
turmoil, although it did expose the weaknesses of inflated property and stock markets as well as 
slackening competitiveness. 
The impact of  the financial crisis 
The  immediate  effect  was  felt  in  stock  prices  and  a  spate  of speculative  attacks  on HK's 
currency, resisted by the Government's credible and robust defence of  its currency board pegging 
it to the US dollar. The more lasting effect, compounded by the weakening Yen and an economic 
slowdown in China, has been to  throw Hong Kong into recession, with falling  output,  falling 
property prices, a shortage of credit, rising business closures and record unemployment of 5%, 
the highest for 15 years. Domestic exports have suffered heavily, falling by 5.4% in the first six 
months of 1998, although re-exports through Hong Kong have in some cases benefited  from 
weakened currencies in the country of  production, notably when sold on to markets with strong 
currencies like the US and the UK. In August the Government announced an estimated negative 
growt}:l pf  -:4% for the whole of 1998. 
Hong Kong's reaction to the crisis 
The SAR Government has reacted to  the crisis by vigorously defending its currency peg.  This 
has brought pain, for the currency board is statutorily bound to  hold the peg by measures that 
have led to high interest rates which in turn have discouraged investment and consumption. 
Latterly, the SAR Government has introduced a series of  measures designed to curb speculation 
on the currency and stock markets, arguing that Hong Kong requires emergency action to restore 
financial stability because it is so heavily dependent on trade: 
o  Firstly, it instructed the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in mid-August to  intervene in the 
Hong Kong equities and futures markets. In the event, an. estimated 10-15% ofthe territory's 
total reserves were spent, boosting the Hang Seng Index by 19% over two weeks. Although 
these holdings have been said to be  temp~rary, this  has  left the SAR Government and  its 
re1ated agencies as one of  the largest shareholders in the territo~. 
e  Secondly,  it  passed  a  series  of measures  in  September  to  strengthen  the  currency  board 
system, increase the transparency of the Exchange Fund and  reinforce the linked exchange 
rate by increasing liquidity in the banking system.The aim has been to smooth out the sharp 
swings in overnight and one-week interbank interest rates. These interbank rates have indeed 
fallen as a result, providing greater interest rate stability. 
2 a  Thirdly, it outlined on a 30-point programme to  tighten up  the disciplines in  the securities 
·and  futures  markets.  The  programme  aims  to  strengthen  regulation  and  enforcement 
t:egarding  the  practice  of selling  currency  and  using  futures  contracts  to  profit  from  the 
subsequent nse in interest rates  and  drop  in  share  prices. The package contains  rules  to 
increase  disclosure requirements,  imprqve  cross-market  supervision,  cap  the  siz~ of open 
positions allowed for any one.futures trader in relation to his o'Yn capital, and tighten up on 
the deadline by which traded shares .must be settled. In addition,· it calls for heavier penalties 
for breaches of securities legislation and market rules relating to unreported short-selling and 
default on settlements.  · 
All financial markets require sophisticated and  effective regulation.  The overriding purpose of 
regulation must be. to supervise trading and ensure the solvency of traders within those markets 
notably through rules to prevent over-expostire and improve transparency. It is clear that many of 
the measures announc~d  by the Hong Kong authorities fit this description..  . 
However,  a fine  line exists  between  necessary regulation ·and  forms  of intervention that may 
distort the free play ofmarket forces.  Regulation should not aim to restrict the forms oftrading in 
which traders are engaged, as these enable markets to move in line with ·economic fundamentals. 
Measures  to  curb  speculation,  if inappropriately  applied,  may  run  the  risk  of distorting  the 
corrective nature of  the markets themselves. In this c.ontext, the Commission is reassured by' the 
SAR Government's statement that the  intervention in  the  equities and 'futures market by the 
HKMA iri  August was  short-lived and  does not herald a departure  from  Hong Kong's long-
standing economic policy. 
In June the Government announced a multi-billion dollar package which included a freeze on the 
sale of  public land to shore up property prices, tax exemption on interest earned in Hong Kong in 
order to encourage repatriation of funds, and a scheme to help SMEs obtain loans. Measures of 
this kind are designed to  tackle the crisis where it hashit hardest - in falling property prices, 
capital flight and business closures. These are unlikely to be misread as signs of  a departure from 
fiscal prudence, as the.policy commitment to fiscal prudence is buttressed by the fact that Hong 
Kong is constitutionally bound to prudent fiscal policies and a balanced budget under Article 107 
ofthe Basic Law. 
The economic relatiqnship between the SAR and China 
The  degree  of interdependence  between  Hong  Kong· and  the  rest of China  il'!  considerable. 
Visible trade between Hong Kong and  the mainland has  grown on average 28%  a year since 
1978.  In 1997, two-way trade grew a moderate 6%, with imports from China rising by 7%, re-
exports back to China by 6% and domestic imports from Hong Kong to  the mainland by·4%. 
Hong Kong was 'the mainland's second largest trading partner in 1997, while China was Hong 
Kong's biggest trading partner.  China was by far the largest source and destination (90%) for 
Hong Kong's re-export business.  There has  also been a major increase in invisible .trade  and 
investment flows from Hong Kong to  the mairiJand, while H;ong Kong remains a major service 
centre for China, notably in financial and business support services.  Hong Kong is also China's 
3 top source of foreign direct investment, while China itself is the second largest source of FDI  in 
Hong Kong in  terms of stock of investment. Hong Kong residents made 34 million trips to  the 
mainland during  ~ 997. 
The  fate  of the  Chinese  and  Hong  Kong  economies  is  therefore  closely  intertwined.  Hong 
Kong's heavy involvement in China means its recovery from current difficulties depends in part 
upon the progress of economic reform in China itself.  Likewise, China needs continued trade, 
investment and know-how from  the SAR_ to  sustain the high growth on which its reforms are 
based.  Above all, both need the stability of each other's currencies in order to  reduce the side-
effects of the  financial  crisis.  Hong Kong  and  China naturally see  each  other as  sources of 
mutual support, a tendency that may have increased since the  <;mset of financial turmoil.  This 
should not be misread as interference in the management of  each other's economies. 
The return of business confidence 
It  is of the utmost importance that business confidence should return to  Hong Kong as soon as 
possible, not only for the future health of bilateral trade and investment but to ease pressure for 
devaluation  bot~ in  the  SAR  and China,  thereby  sustaining  the  credibility of China's  own 
economic  reform  programme.  Despite  the  severe  economic  downturn  currently  hitting  Hong 
Kong, the Commission remains convinced that wherever the economic fu!J.damentals are broadly 
sound,  as  they  are  in  Hong  Kong,  confidence  will  never  be  gone  for  long.  However,  that 
confidence will  depend significantly on the  SAR  maintaining  an  op_en  trade  and  investment 
regime.  Hong Kong should continue to  set an example to  neighbouring countries that may be 
tempted to  learn the wrong lessons  from  the turmoil by closing their own markets or slowing 
down reforms. This in tum will help restore the confidence of  the business community. 
Government and legislation 
The way government functions . 
Hong Kong's Chief Executive governs with the support of  the Executive Council and Legislative 
Council  (LegCo)  backed  by  an  indepenoent  civil  service.  The  Chief Executive  leads  the 
Government, decides on Government policies and issues executive orders.  He implements the 
Basic  Law,  and  signs  bills  and  budgets  passed by  the  LegCo.  He  liaises  w_ith  the  Chinese 
_Government, reporting budgets and accounts to  it for the record, nominating top SAR officials 
for appointment by Beijing and implementing directives issued by China as provided for by the 
Basic Law. He appoints and removes judges and public office-holders in accordance with legal 
procedures,  as  well  as  handling  external  and  other  affairs  as  authorised  by  the  Chinese 
Government. 
The Executive Council advises the LegCo on all principal legislation before it is introduced into 
the  LegCo,  and  has  the  power to  make  subsidiary  legislation under  a number of ordinances 
4 passed  by  the  LegCo.  Where  the  Executive  Council  advises  on  matters  involving  the 
expenditure of public funds, its advice is subject to  such funds  being approved by the Finance 
Committee oftheLegCo.  · 
The Basic Law provides for a number of checks and balances that govern relations between the 
Chief Executive and  the  LegCo.  In  partic'ular,  bills relating to  government policies caimot  ~e 
introduced by LegCo members without the written consent of the Chief Executive. The Chief 
Executive  must  sign  and  promulgate bills  passed  by a two-thirds  majority of the  LegCo  on 
second reading or otherwise dissolve the  LegCo.  The Chief Executive may  also  diss.olve  the 
LegCo if it fails to pass a budget or other major bill introduced by the Government. For his part, 
the  Chief Executi.ve  must resign if after dissolution of the  LegCo,  the newly elected LegCo 
continues t.o  refuse to pass the same bill which led to dissolution in the first place, ·or which the 
Chief Executive refused to  sign.  N.one  of these provisions have been invoked since the Basic 
Law entered into force. 
The political relationship between the Chief Executive and the LegCo has at tiines been strained. 
Disagreements have occurred between the executive and the legislature on issues ranging from 
LegCo rules and procedures, amendment of  the holiday bill, and extension of  the loan scheme to 
help  first-time  buyers,  to  the  review  of the  SAR's municipal  structure.  Differences  of view 
between the executive and  legislative branches of government are  quite  natural  and can bnng 
creative tension to the governmental process. However, concerns have been expressed about the 
executive-led structure in which no  politically appointed ministers sit in the Chief Executive's 
Cabinet. This centres all the political responsibility on three top Government officials and more 
specifically  on  the  Chief Executive  himself and  does  not  allow  the  burden  of defending 
government policies and actions to  be spread across different levels. This has led some LegCo 
members to call for a ministerial-type cabinet.  In his 1998 Policy Address delivered on October 
7, the Chief Executive, while reaffirming that Hong Kong should continue to have an executive-
led Government, stated his intention to improve cooperation between the various institutions of 
the SAR. 
The legislative prog·ramme  .  .  .  .  _ 
For most of the past year,  the legislative role has been carried out by the Provisional LegCo, 
selected before the handover and now replaced by the full LegCo following the elections in-M~y · 
this year.  By October a total .of 63 bills, had passed through the Provisional LegCo, 50 of them 
since the handover. The overwhelming majority of these bills have not prompted questions as to 
the autonomous functioning of  the legislative process in Hong Kong. 
A significant development was the  SAR Government's stated intention not to  introduce draft 
legislation  in  the  immediate  future  for  the  purpose  of enacting  laws, on  treason,  secession, 
sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, as well as 
regulating the activities of  foreign political organisations. 
5 On  October 7,  the Chief Executive delivered his  second annual policy address, entitled "From 
Adversity to  Opportunity".  In  it he predicts that growth will shri'nk by 4% and  unemployment, 
already at 5%, will continue to rise as a result of  the crisis.  He promises to stimulate growth by 
aiding  investment  in  new  technology  and  by reforming· well  established businesses,  notably 
financial  services.  Priority will be given to  small and medium sized companies.  The policy 
address emphasises the SAR's continued· commitment to  free markets.  It reiterates the need to 
improve education and the environment, while signalling a certain shift away from the building 
of subsidised housing and towards better loaning facilities for house-buyers.  The address refers 
extensively to  improving links with 'the  mainland,  for  example by improving the  climate for 
investment there for SAR-based companies.· 
On  the political  side,  it  alludes  to  the  reduction  in  the  number of lower  government  levels, 
replacing regional and  local  councils with district boards.  The policy address states  that the 
direct  election of the  LegCo  and  the Chief Executive remain  the  ultimate  aim,  but  does  not 
elaborate on how or when this will be done. 
The fight against corruption 
The SAR authorities have shown determination to maintain Hong Kong's reputation for clean 
government  and business.  There has  been  a  rise  in  the  number of allegations  of corruption 
reported to  the Independent Commission Against' Corruption (ICAC) - 1,,780 cases in the first 
half of 1998, a 20% increase over the same period last year - but this may reflect the growing 
confidence among SAR citizens to-resort to the ICAC rather than an actual increase in corruption  .. 
itself.  Most  complaints  are  from  the  private  sector,  including  fi~ancial  services,  trade  and 
property, while some cases referred to  the ICAC have included gifts received by government 
officials, illegal betting and the alleged inflation of  a newspaper's circulation figures. There have 
been few  if any complaints of a general fall in business standards this last year,  despite fears 
voiced before the handover. 
A  legislator,  Chim Pui-chung,  was  disqualified  from  the  LegCo  in  September this  year after 
being sentenced to three years  in  prison  for attempting to  forge  share-transfer documents. The 
Basic  Law  allows  for  disqualification  of a  member  convicted  of at  least  one  month's 
imprisonment. Chim was released on bail and is appealing against his sentence. 
The judicial system 
The independence of the judiciary,  as  laid  down in the Joint Declaration and Basic  Law,  is 
central  to  the  smooth  functioning  of the  '.one  country  two  systems'  formula.  The  Joint 
Declaration states that laws in place before the handover will remain unchanged, the judiciary 
will operate independently, trial by jury and the right to a fair trial will continue, and Hong Kong 
will have its own Court of Final Appeal with jurisdiction and power of adjudication over all 
cases except acts of  state related to defence and foreign affairs.  - · 
6 .This independence has been respected in the vast majority of  cases since the handover. The Court 
of First Instance adjudicated more than .1300 appeals in civil and criminal cases in 1997, while 
the Court of Appeal  dealt with some 750 cases in  the same  year~ The Court of Final  Appeal 
delivered just one ruling while examining the  validity for  appeal of eight others.  Of all these 
.  ~ases, ve~  few have raised questions about the independent functioning of  the SARjudiciary. 
Shortly after the handover, a case arose concerning a defence (the Ma Wai Kwan case) based on 
the claim that laws ·and indictments predating the handover were invalid on the grounds that the 
Provisional LegCo which carried them over was itself created in  breach ofthe Basic Law. The 
Hong  Kong  Court of Appeal  took  the  view  that  no  decision  or institution  sanctioned  by the 
Chinese National People's Congress could be examined by the courts of the SAR. The practical 
impact of  this specific case i:nay be limited as the Provisional LegCo has since been dismantled, 
but it did cast a temporary shadow over the immediate  p9st-h~ndover period, when sensitivities 
about the one-country-two-systems formula were particularly strong. 
On its  last day  in office,  the  Provisional LegCo  passed a bill  under which certain privileges . 
granted to institutions under British rule are transferred to Chinese State bodies to reflect China's 
resumption of sovereignty  ..  Under the  colonial  regime,  laws  did  not  apply  to  British  CroWn 
institutions unless expressly stat.ed in Hong Kong's law.  The SAR Government has interpreted 
the bill to include Xinhua, the New China News Agency, among those Chinese State organs and 
agencies which should enjoy similar privileges. However, SAR law requires that Chinese State 
organs and agencies-must carryout executive funCtions,  must not engage in commercial. activity 
and  must  act  within  their  mandate.  One  particular  area  of concern  is·  Xinhua~s apparent 
involvement in  overseeing Cliina's state-owned enterprises in  the SAR,  as  well as  the precise 
. remit of  Xinhua since the handover. 
Human rights, political freedoms and public order 
The Basic Law guarantees widespread freedoms  for the people of Hong Kong,  including free 
speech,  a  free  press,  freedom  to  publish,  freedom  of association,  assembly,  procession  and 
demonstration, the right to join trade unions and the right to strike, freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
freedom of  movement, and freedom of  religious belief. 
A high degree of fr~edom has  been maintained in all of these areas since the SAR came into 
being. Public demonstrations are an almost daily occurrence. Citizens have demonstrated freely 
on  economic  issues,  such  as  high  rents  and  the  closure  of investment  banks,  and  against 
government  positions .  and  poli'cies.  They  have  also  commemorated  the  Tiananmen  Square 
incident twice, once with an attendance of  40,000 people. 
There have been no reports of any violation of fundamental rights since the handover. No human 
rights activists,  political opponents or Chinese dissidents have been detained or harassed,  and 
human rights organisations continue to operate with 
1no apparent curtailment of their activities or 
pressure from the authorities.  · 
7 The right to demonstrate 
The Provisional LegCo introduced restrictive amendments to  two colonial laws -the Societies 
Ordinance and the Public Order Ordinance -both within the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. Firstly, 
demonstrators must now obtain advance permission from  the police rather than merely giving 
them notice. Secondly, all societies must now be registered, and this can be refused on 'national 
security' grounds. It should be added that no difficulties appear to have been encountered as  a 
result of  this provision and no applications for registration have been rejected, in the words of  the 
Secretary  for  Justice,  ·"for  political  or  any  other  reasons."  Furthermore,  over  1,600 
demonstrations took place in the first year after the handover. 
Labour law 
The  Provisional  LegCo  also  suspended  four  labour  laws  passed  before  the  handover  by  the 
previous LegCo. Those laws concerned unions' rights of  collective bargaining on salaries and on 
funding  for  political  activities,  prevention  of anti-union  discrimination  by  employers,  and  a 
broadening of the Bill of Rights. Three months later,  in  October  1997, the Provisional LegCo 
then repealed the  laws on collective bargaining and anti-union discrimination, while amending 
the  law  on union  funding  by requiring  prior permission  from  the  Chief Executive.  This  has 
aroused  concern  among  international  trade  union  bodies,  and  the  Commission  continues  to 
monitorit closely. 
Implementing the,UN Covenants 
In  April  1998  the Government produced draft reports on the  implementation of the  two  UN 
Covenants, one on Civil and Political Rights and the other on· Sociar and Cultural Rights. These 
drafts referred to the Societies Ordinance and the Public Order Ordinance mentioned above and 
to the repeal of the pre-amendment Bill of Rights, as well as other issues including the right of 
abode of mainland-born ·children of Hong Kong people, the  fight  against bird flu,  contingency 
plans on  unemployment and  staffing problems in public hospitals. However, the reports did not 
mention  the  repeal  of the  labour  laws  or  the  introduction  of the  anti-subversion  bill.  The 
Government s.aid it was too early to say whether such controversial issues would be included in 
the report.  · 
The drafts were opened for public consultation in April and were to be submitted to the Foreign 
Ministry by the end of  the year. They would then be passed on to the UN by Permission Mission 
of the  People's Republic of China in New  York.  The  SAR Government  has  stated that  the 
Beijing authorities do not have the right to amend the reports, but that they have to be formally 
submitted to the UN by the sovereign power, China, rather than directly. by the SAR itself.  A 
total of  eleven submissions on the draft reports were received by various interest groups during a 
five-week  consultation  period  in March.  In addition,· a report  under  the  Convention  on  the 
Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women was recently submitted to the United 
Nations.  · 
8 Press freedom 
There  have  been  no  reports  of any  attempts  by  tlie  authorities  to  interfere  in  the  editorial· 
independence of  the media. The European Commission is encouraged by the degree to which the 
Hong Kong press remains active in its coverage of  demonstrations, in  the space it devotes to the 
debate on human rights in  the SAR and throughout China, and. in  its reporting ofthe views of 
opposition parties. The Hong Kong media also freely exploits its own e4itorial right to criticise 
the policies ofthe SAR Government and those of  the Chinese authorities. 
However,  last February a prominent  deputy  from  the  National  People's Congress  in Beijing 
accused  Radio  Television  Hong  Kong  (RTHK). of being  too  openly  critical  of the  SAR 
Government, prompting a heated debate as,to whether adverse  public  comment from  Beijing 
amounted  to  interference  in  SAR affairs.  The  SAR  leadership  reaCted  by defending RTHK's 
editorial  independence  while  expressing hope that all  inedia would  be  fair  and  objective  in 
reporting government policies. This, like other episodes during the last year, show.s how so many 
one:..off events in the early months of  the SAR were immediately subjected to close scrutiny for 
any bearing they may have on the functioning of  the one-country-two-systems concept. 
Freedom of information and data protection 
The Commission is reassured that freedom of inforihation has been broadly respected during the 
first year of  the SAR. It notes, however, that the Xinhua news agency declined a request made by 
legislator Emily Lau under the data protection Ordinance to have access to her file.  Xinhua did 
not react to  the  request within the .prescribed  40-day time limit and  the  Secretary for  Justice 
declined to prosecute Xinhua. The situation raised concern that Xinhua had been placed above· 
the law because it was a'Chinese State organisation. The SAR Govemmenthas r~peatedly denied 
the claim, and has announced separately t}lat the Ordinance will be reviewed. 
The role of the Chinese garrison 
When  Chinese  delegations  visit,  police  presence  tends  to  be  stepped  up  in  order  to  keep 
demonstrators  at  bay.  The ·Chinese  garrison  stationed  in  the  SAR. has  kept  a  low  profile 
throughout the year, in keeping with the Joint Declaration which states that the garrison will not 
interfere in the intymal affairs of  the SAR.  · 
The de'!'ocratic process 
A  fair  analysis of  the  democratic  process  in  Hong Kong  needs to  take  account of three  key 
factors : the degree of democracy achieved so  far,  a comparison with the situation before the 
handover, and progress towards the ultimate goal of universal suffrage to  which the territory is 
committed. 
9 The Chief Executive and the Government have honoured their pledge to  hold elections for the 
Legislative  Council  during  the  first  year  of the  SAR.  The  Provisional  LegCo  was  duly 
dismantled, making way for the election of a new LegCo last May which will run until the year 
2000.  The elections were marked by a record turnout of 53%, well above the previous record of 
35.8% in 1995, and a major success for the Democratic Party, which won 13  seats, 9 of  them in 
the geographical constituencies where full suffrage was in operation. The result indicates a strong 
appetite for democracy in Hong Kong, particularly at a time when the prospect of recession has 
shown many that economic prosperity can no longer be taken for granted. 
The May elections  .. 
New electoral niles were adopted in time for the May elections, according to which 20 of  the 60 
seats were returned through geographical constituencies by proportional representation, and 30 
through  'functional'  constituencies  representing  professional  sectors.  The  remaining  10  seats 
were  subject  to  election  one  month  earlier by an  800-strong  Election  Committee comprising 
businessmen,  professionals  and  the  labour,  social  and  religious  services,  as  well  as  political 
figures, including local deputies to the. National Pe.ople's Congress in Beijing. The new electoral 
rules, while not being contrary to the Basic Law, mark a step back from the reforms introduced 
in 1995. While the number of seats open to full suffrage remained the same (20), the number of 
people  eligible to  vote  in the  functional  constituencies  was  reduced  (180,000  instead of 2.7 
million, ie just professionals rather than all empl~yees). 
Moves towards universal suffrage 
A more lasting test of the SAR Government's long-term commitment to  democracy will come 
from  the  pace  ~nd means  with  which  full  universal  suffrage  is  introduced.  The  Basic  Law 
commits the SARto the gradual and orderly introduction of  universal suffrage for the election of 
both the Chief  Executive and the LegCo. The Basic Law stipulates that the direct election of  50% 
of  the LegCo's seats must be achieved by 2004.  For the 2007 elections and thereafter, it is in the 
hands ofthe Hong Kong SAR itself as to when univer~al suffrage is introduced. 
The SAR Government is within its rights to accelerate this process, although this would require 
an amendment to the Basic Law. For this, the approval of  the Chief Executive and a 2/3 majority 
in  LegCo  would  be  needed,  and  the  am<?ndment  would have  to  be  reported, to  the  National 
People's Congress for  the record.  On July  15  this  year,  opposition parties  called for  such  an · 
acceleration, proposing universal suffrage for the LegCo in 2000 and for the Chief Executive two 
years later.  The motion was  rejected by the  LegCo.  The Chief Executive has voiced his own 
commitment to the goal without pinning a particular date to it : « after 2007, it is up to us, the 
people of  Hong Kong, to decide for ourselves the further development of  the democratic process, 
with the ultimate aim of  universal suffrage» (CH Tung, Brussels, October 20 1997). 
The Commission will continue to  pay close attention to  the development of democracy in the 
SAR.  The Commission has ask;ed  Hong Kong  to  clarify in advance how  and when  the  move 
towards  universal  suffrage  will  be  completed.  The  Commission  has  stressed  on  several 
10 occasions  that  the  EU  was  generally  encouraged  by  the  SAR  Government's  long-term 
commitment to  full  democracy, adding ·that the authorities would  earn considerable respect at· 
little  cost  if they were to  announce  soon their intention to introduce universal  suffrage by a 
specific  date.  Hong' Kong  should announce  soon  its  unequivocal  comJ.Tiitment  to  universal 
suffrage and fix a reasonably early date for its full implementation. 
International relations · 
Hong Kong retains a wide degree of autonomy in its ability to. deepen relations with its world 
trading  partners.  It is  also  a  member of the  World  Trade  Organisation  in  its  own right,  and· 
participates actively as  a  separate member of other· multilateral bodies.  The  Commission has 
sought over the last year to  set the EU's ties with the SAR on a more pemianent footing as  a 
means  of. enhancing  trade  and  investment,  upholding  Hong  Kong's  own  autonomy  and  '  . 
strengthening  the  multilateral  trading  system  to  which  both  the  EU  and  Hong  Kong  are 
particularly attached  ... 
The EU-Hong Kong Business Cooperation Committees, which bring business leaders from the 
EU and the SAR together, are proving to be a successful vehicle to explore the reinforcing of 
economic and commercial ties between the two  sides.  The Commission also  notes that Hong 
Kong has set up a council of international advisers - including European business figures - to 
help it revitalise its economy and assert its role on the international stage. 
Bilateral agreements 
As regards bilateral agreements with the SAR, the Basic Law states that Beijing is  responsible 
for  foreign  affairs and defence, while the SAR will  conduct external relations in such areas as 
trade, the economy, financial and monetary affairs,.shipping, commUIVcations and tourism. The 
SAR Government has concluded at least 21  bilateral agreements since July 3ro 1997. These cover 
air services, mutual legal assistance and the transfer of  sentenced persons, visa abolition, and the 
promotion and protection of  investment. The ECand Hong Kong have pursued the creation of a 
customs cooperation agreement throughout the year, and negotiations have proceeded smoothly. 
The Commission believes such an  accord will consolidate the. global view of Hong Kong as a 
separate . customs  territory,  as  well  as  strengthening  ·the  fight  against  copyright  abuse, 
counterfeiting, drug trafficking and other common concerns. 
Multilateral trade 
In  the multilateral  field,, the Commission vigorously supports the SAR's independenrvoice in 
international bodies.  Over the last year Hong Kong hal? been a powerful advocate of  further trade 
liberalisation, encouraging Asian neighbours to open their financial services markets through the 
WTO  agreement  reached  last  December  at  a time  when  the  regional  crisis  was ·providing 
tempting,  if misguided,  arguments against such opening.  Also  through its voice in  the WTO, 
Hong Kong has supported calls for a new comprehensive set of trade liberalisation negotiations 
11 from  1999 onwards, whilst also advocating further liberalisation through the Apec forum. Hong 
Kong officials have also participated in other international bodies, in the area of  civil aviation for 
exa1J1ple,  a~,part of  the Chinese delegation.  " 
Promoting trade liberalisation in China 
The. Commission also believes Hong Kong is well placed to advocate greater trade liberalisation 
within China itself,  and  has  frequently  discussed  China's WTO  accession negotiations  in  its 
regular contacts with the SAR during the year. Hong Kong will be one of  the major beneficiaries 
of Chinese  membership  of the  WTO,  and this  in  tum will  benefit  China.  The  Commission 
believes Hong Kong's own liberal, transparent economy, as well as its effective voice within the 
WTO,  will  act  as  an  example  to  all  China  of how  an  open,  globally  integrated  market  is 
necessary to achieve lasting· economic strength. 
Visas .and immigration 
The SAR has the authority to issue passports and other travel documents, as well as applying its 
own immigration controls. 
While  the  Commission  has  no  direct  responsibility  for  the  issuing  of visas,  it  does  have  a 
competence for proposing the list of third countries whose nationals should be subject to a visa 
obligation by all Member States. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, that competence will be extended 
to cover making proposals to establish the list of countries whose nationals should be exempted 
from the visa requirement by all Member States. In these contexts, it will have to consider what 
visa  regime  to  propose  for  Hong  Kong.  Under  the  current  arrangements,  holders  of SAR 
passports are visa-exempt for two EU MembetStates ·(the UK and Ireland) in recognition of  the 
special position of  the territory. The Commission is well-disposed toJhe continued recognition of 
this special status: It is also aware of the importance which Hong Kong, including in particular 
. its  business community and  European companies  operating there,  attaches  to  being  accorded 
similar visa-exempt status by as many Member States as possible. It further notes Hong Kong's 
sustained determination to demonstrate that its immigration policy, particularly vis-a-vis citizens 
from  the mainland, is adequately enforced, and that its travel documents are protected by state-
of-the-art foregery-proofing.  In the light of these efforts, whose successful implementation will 
need  to  be  carefully  monitored,  the  Commission believes  that  a  generous  attitude  from  EU 
Member States would further underpin Hong Kong's status as a separate customs territory with 
its own immigration policy, a key pillar of  the one-country-two-systems formula. 
12 ConcUusffon  · 
The 'one country two systems' approach is a key element in Hong Kong's stability, freedom and 
prosperity following the resumption of  Chinese sovereignty over the territory. After one year it is 
already proving to be a workable formula that deserves the full  support of the European Union 
and other partners.  The  handover itself has~ gone  smoothly,  and  the  authorities of both Hong 
Kong  and  Beijing  have  fo1lowed  it  up  -with  a  determination  to  make  the  division  of 
responsibilities between them function effeCtively and clearly  .. 
Durjng  the  early  months of the  SAR,  every new  law,  legal  case or government act  has  been 
closely scrutinised· by civil rights activists,  opposition politicians, the media and the. public at 
large  for  its  potential  threat  to  Hong  Kong's autonomy,  and  on  isolated, occasions they  have 
prompted questions about the SAR authorities' commitment to  upholding that autonomy. Such 
intense scrutiny is in itself a healthy sign that Hong Kong's people and  institutions feel  willing 
and able to provide a necessary check on the authorities that run their lives. In its own scrutiny of 
developments  in  the  SAR since the  handover,  the  European  Commission  does  not  detect  an · 
overall policy shit! towards  greater restrictiveness.  The Commission will continue to  monitor 
.  . 
events in  the Hong  Kong  SAR in the  belief that  a strict  application of the  one-country-two-
systems formula holds the key to its lasting economic prosperity and the wellbeing of  its citizens. 
The May el~ctions, although limited in their degree of suffrage, were a positive step on the road 
to universal democracy as stipulated by the Basic Law. The result reflects a growing appetite for 
the democratic process, not least at a time when financial troubles have removed the certainty of 
economic1wellbeing for many Hong Kong citizens. 
The financial  crisis has deprived the SAR,  at  a delicate stage  in  its development, of the  high 
growth  and  business confidence that has  characterised Hong kong's economy in  the  past.  Its 
strict adherence to transparency, prudent budgetary control and a stable currency is therefore all 
the  more admirable in  the face  of such adversity.  This will  ultimately encourage' the  return of 
business. confidence once the financial crisis subsides.  ,  - · 
The  Commission  has  little  doubt  that  such  confidence  will  soon  return,  provided  the SAR 
Government-sticks closely to  the principles of sound regulation and .open trade, as  well as the 
unimpeded functioning of markets with intervention strictly limited to internationally accepted 
standards  and  practices.  The  Commission also  welcomes the chance to  exchange views  with 
Hong Kong regarding the improvement of the international financial  architecture.  Hong Kong 
remains one of the most open economies  in-the world.  Its  well  tested  economic  principles, 
together with close adherence to  the political and sociaL freedoms enshrined in the Basic Law, 
will be the territory's best guarantor of future stability. The EU has an important role to play in 
that  process  through  continual  support  for  the  SAR  anchored  m  an  ever  deeper  and  more 
permanent relat1onship. 